Javits Debate by Mansfield, Mike, 1903-2001
University of Montana
ScholarWorks at University of Montana
Mike Mansfield Speeches Mike Mansfield Papers
2-20-1964
Javits Debate
Mike Mansfield 1903-2001
Let us know how access to this document benefits you.
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mansfield_speeches
This Speech is brought to you for free and open access by the Mike Mansfield Papers at ScholarWorks at University of Montana. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Mike Mansfield Speeches by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks at University of Montana. For more information, please
contact scholarworks@mso.umt.edu.
Recommended Citation
Mansfield, Mike 1903-2001, "Javits Debate" (1964). Mike Mansfield Speeches. 556.
https://scholarworks.umt.edu/mansfield_speeches/556
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- SENATE February 20 
Mr. JAVITS. I yield. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. I appreciate the 
comments which the d1stlngu.1shed Sen-
ator from New York has just made. I 
am sorry I have not been able to follow 
the full content of his speech, because-
as always-! know he makes a distinct 
contribution. 
But I would say that while Communist 
Chlna is a menacing shadow over all of 
southeast Asia--and perhaps we could 
say over south Asia, as well. in view of 
the aggressive tactics of Communist 
China some months ago against India-
it is my belief that so far as Hanoi-
North Vietnam-is concerned, based on 
the ancient enmity of the Vietnamese 
people toward China, the relationship 
between Hanoi and the Soviet Union may 
well be closer and may prove to be a 
mitigating factor. 
I would point out that so far as Gen-
eral de Gaulle is concerned, to the best 
of my knowledge he did not Indicate that 
Communist China should be brought in-
to consideration in connection with all of 
old Indochina, but that his remarks di-
verged in two directions. One was recog-
nition of Peiping, which I think was a 
tragic mistake, as I said yesterday; and 
in that respect I join in the remarks 
made by the Senator from Minnesota 
[Mr. HUMPHREY], the Senator from Con-
necticut [Mr. Doool, the Senator from 
Ohio [Mr. LAuscHE], and others in de-
ploring that act. Aside from what the 
French did on their own responsibility in 
that respect, and in connection with a 
government which is acting within those 
bounds, I was sorry to note that the Gov-
ernment of Formosa broke relations with 
General de Gaulle, although I under-
stand that, in effect, that was forced by 
Paris, in an attempt to get away from 
continued French recognition of Formo-
sa and to make possible French recogni-
tion of Peiping. That is an unfortunate 
situation; and I think the Nationalists 
by their action took President de Gaulle 
out of a hole in which he had inadvert-
ently placed himself. 
So far as the other divergent view-
Indochina-is concerned, I think Gen-
eral de Gaulle, who is a man of great his-
toric perspective, and quite often offers 
ideas which at least are worth considera-
tion-whether they prove to be nght or 
wrong, only time will tell, is aware of a 
deepening difficulty in that area; and 
certainly France, based on 80 years of ex-
perience in Laos, Cambodia, and the two 
Vietnams, is in a position to speak with 
some degree of authority. 
It is true that the United States has 
15,500 troops there at the present time, as 
"advisers." We are faced with a number 
of choices. We can go ahead and can 
increase our military commitment and 
can increase our resource expenditures 
and can carry the war to North Viet-
nam, and maybe Into Communist China, 
itself, and be prepared to pay the con-
sequences. I do not think that Is the 
motive behind American thinking I 
hope it is not. 
Or we can withdraw. I think that 
would be just as bad a mistake, because 
then South Vietnam and the rest of 
southeast Asia would be placed at the 
mercy of elements connected with the 
Communist movement. 
There may be a third alternative, and 
it may be the suggestion advanced by De 
Gaulle--which may be a good one or may 
be a bad one; at the moment, no one can 
tell. But it any stability 1s to be brought 
to South VIetnam, It 1.s not going to be 
done on the basis of coup after coup after 
coup. 
Personally, I deplore what happened 
to the late President Ngo Diem Dinh, 
who, in spite of all his faults, I thought 
was a good man, and who did maintain 
a degree of civilian control over that gov-
ernment. If he had his way, I think he 
might In time have achieved a degree of 
stabll1ty which would have redounded to 
the benefit of his country. 
But if we go back to the Geneva Agree-
ment of 1954, to which we were not sig-
natories, we recall that that agreement 
partitioned Vietnam at the 17th paral-
lel, and also contained a provision that 
within 2 years thereafter there would be 
elections, in both North Vietnam and 
and South Vietnam, as to what the fu-
ture of the country would be. 
I do not endorse the election proposal 
in that Geneva Agreement; but, after all, 
we did agree--at least, by association-
to a line of demarcation of the 17th 
parallel. 
I belleve that the stability of South 
Vietnam must be maintained; and if, for 
example, there Is some way, based on De 
Gaulle's suggestion, and apart from any 
consideration of Peiping and recognition 
of Communist China, that this stab1l!ty 
could be given a chance to enhance it-
self, and if Vietnam could become a more 
stable nation, then I think the idea, if not 
the proposal, is at least worth consider-
ing. 
I repeat that it may be a good idea; it 
may be a bad idea; it may have some 
value; it may be worthless. But we have 
to have something to contrast with the 
choice between going all the way in or 
all the way out; and one of the ideas ad-
vanced in that area is such a factor as 
an international patrol which would 
guarantee a true neutrality and a true 
territorial integrity which would stop the 
ftow of arms along the Ho Chi Minh 
traii-{)r by sea, which is the way they 
seem to be coming in at the present 
time--that stability perhaps to be main-
tained by American troops who are 
there, and or perhaps by others of in-
ternational agencies, so that there would 
be a type of neutrality based on guaran-
tees-not on words, proposals, or 
promises. 
So I think these statements should be 
made--even though they have taken a 
little longer than I anticipated when I 
asked the distinguished Senator !rom 
New York to yield-in order to indicate 
that a proposal coming from a quarter 
with which we have had differences, but 
with which we are still, on the whole, 
friendly, should not be treated casually, 
should not be tossed out the window; 
but if such an idea has merit, it should 
be given some consideration; and if, 
after study, we find that it has no merit, 
then it should be tossed aside. 
Mr. JAVTI'S. Mr. President, no one 
respects the majority leader more than 
I do. I have said that many times, and 
I am sure he knows that. 
Mike Mansfield Papers, Series 21, Box 42, Folder 33, Mansfield Library, University of Montana
1964 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD- SENATE 3155 
I rose today only to make clear what 
I think needs to be made clear even 1t 
that does involve a difference with the 
maJority leader. 
What I thought needed to be made 
clear waa that the struggle which we are 
helping to wage in South Vietnam 1.1 
understandable to the American people, 
and that they are determined to wage 
it, and that they will not stop waging it 
until they see a much better solution 
than De Gaulle's idea that he will "take 
care of it", and just "leave it to him." 
After all, he "took care of it" at Dien 
Bien Phu, too. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. No; he did not, 
because he was not in power at the time. 
Mr. JAVITS. I am speaking about 
France. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. But on the basts 
of what the distinguished senator from 
New York has said, I hope he will keep 
ui mind the other two alternatives-be-
cause he is making a distinct contribu-
tion, and we have remained silent too 
long on this subject. 
It ls all very well for the people to talk 
about Panama and Cyprus and the diffi.-
cultles there; but perhaps the most dim-
cult problem at the present time ls the 
one in southeast Asia. On that basis 
and on the basis of the intelUgence the 
Senator from New York always displays, 
I think his suggestions will be a servtcP. 
to the country, which 1s dlspla.ylng great 
interest in this most dlmcult and vexa-
tious problem. 
Mr. JA VITS. Mr. President, I am 
most grateful to the majority leader. 
I point out that the minute we begin 
to talk about neutralization and neutral-
ism, the backbone and the spirit could go 
out of the action which 1s being taken 
in this struggle. No one would intend 
that or desire it to happen, but such 
things do happen. 
Therefore, I thought it important to 
emphasiZe-and to speak these words in 
the same forum-the determination of 
the American people, as I view it, to 
carry on the struggle in Vietnam until 
there 1s a far more viable solution. 
Mr. President, let us remember that 
our forces are in South Korea, and have 
been there for 14 years; that South 
Korea has not been neutralized; but that, 
nonetheless, the confrontation between 
ourselves and the Communist Chinese in 
South Korea has been a very restraining 
influence upon the Communist Chinese, 
and will continue to be for a very long 
time to come. 
Let us remember also in respect of 
Communist China that her Incursion 
against India, her deals with Pakistan, 
the taking of Tibet, and her assaults, 
which for the m oment have ceased, on 
Taiwan, certainly are not reassuring in 
terms of the intentions of Communist 
China, which I believe are very clear-to 
dominate the whole of the Asian Con-
tinent. 
With all due respect to the Senator 
from Montana, I believe he assumes far 
too much when he assumes that the rela-
tions between Ho Chi Minh and Moscow 
are better than the relations between Ho 
Chi Minh and Mao Tse-tung. I believe 
there are many proverbs, both Eastern 
and Western, to the effect that the tiger 
at the door is much more important than 
the tiger in the forest. 
It 1a inconceivable to me, and to most 
Americans, that Ho Chi Minh could be 
carrying on this guerrilla war throughout 
South Vietnam and Cambodia and into 
Laos without the friendship , support, and 
alliance of the Communist Chinese, who 
are on his doorstep, and without whom 
he could not survive for 20 minutes. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, 
will the Senator yield? 
Mr. JAVITS. I yield. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. If the Senator 
wlll go back over his history, he will 
recall that the enmity between Vietnam, 
and the Chinese to the north goes back 
well over 1,000 years. Much of Vietnam, 
and almost all of southeast Asia, were 
either tributary to or vassal kingdoms 
of the Chinese emperors. 
There 1s an inherent fear on the part 
of all Vietnamese because of the nearness 
of China; and there is, I believe, testi-
mony to the effect that even in recent 
weeks there have been exchanges of 
missions between Moscow and Hanoi 
by means of which North VIetnamese 
groups went to Moscow for the purpose 
of seeking assistance from the Soviet 
Union. 
The Senator will recall that when the 
activities in Laos were being carried on 
by the Pathet Lao, it was not the Com-
munist Chinese who were sending down 
the supplies by sea from Vladivostok and 
elsewhere on the Siberian coast, but it 
was the Soviet Union which was sending 
down those supplies to Haiphong, tbe 
port for Hanoi, and from there sent 
overland into Laos and were taken over 
by the Pathet Lao. 
There have been no indications, I ad-
mit, that in recent months there have 
been any Soviet airlifts or Soviet sea 
trips from Vladivostok or any other ports 
to Hanoi. But I still think that basically 
the friendship is toward Moscow, and 
basically the enmity on the part of the 
Vietnamese, North and South, is still 
directed toward Pe!ping. 
Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, I would 
not wish to be distracted from the main 
scene by what Is a sideshow. We all 
know that the Poles and the Finns hate 
the Russians, too. Nevertheless, those 
people do the bidding of the Russians 
because they have no other choice. Be 
that as it may, the end point Is as fol-
lows: If North Vietnam should be able 
to overrun South Vietnam, and thus de-
stroy the whole position in south and 
southeast Asia, she would be doing an 
inestimable service to Communist China. 
That is all I am speaking about. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, 
will the Senator yield? 
Mr. JAVITS. I yield. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Who has indicated 
that North Vietnam would seek to over-
run South Vietnam? Who has brought 
out any indication that General Giap, 
an able soldier, has ever used his troops 
on that basis to penetrate into North 
Vietnam? It may be that elements of 
the North Vietnamese Army have pene-
trated into South Vietnam. I do not 
know. 
But south of Saigon, in the Meko~ 
Delta, there are a number of Commu-
nist VIetcong elements which do not 
seem to be decreasing in number, and 
which have been most effective In f1ght-
1ng the VIetnamese Army in that par-
ticular area. Of course, circumstances-
geography and terrain-are on their 
side, as was the case in the Red River 
Delta outside of Hanoi when the French 
were in control and tried to subjugate 
that area. They were unsuccessful. 
The point is as follows: To the best 
of my knowledge, only Irregular ele-
ments have been coming Into South VIet-
nam. Perhaps certain elements of the 
North Vietnamese Army have also come 
in. Again, I do not know for certain the 
facts In this matter. 
Mr. JAVITS. The Senator from New 
York has certainly not charged that 
which he knows nothing about as to the 
regular elements of the North Vietna-
mese Army. But It 1s very clear-and 
upon this point the Senator from New 
York has received ample confirmation-
that the lines of supply and the base 
of support for what 1s going on in South 
Vietnam are in North Vietnam. 
When things really became hot, as 
they did at one time in the northern 
provinces, the Communist elements 
moved over into North Vietman for rest, 
reequipment, and supply. Without that 
base, the whole operation of the Com-
munists in South Vietnam would be un-
tenable. We well know Communist 
technique in these wars of so- called na-
tional liberation which are fought In 
precisely that way. We also know that 
if the Communists should take over in 
South Vietnam, it would be as effective, 
from the point of view of the free world, 
in that there would be another Com-
munist state which would play freely 
with North Vietnam and Communist 
China. That is the only point I am 
making. 
I do not desire to be diverted from 
my main point. I believe the American 
people support what 1s being done in 
South Vietnam. I do not believe that 
the American people are in any mood to 
back away from it. If they are, they 
should not be, because though we are 
suffering casualties and running grave 
risks, the alternatives are far more dire. 
Let us remember that even a great na-
tion must suffer casualties currently in 
order to avoid even greater casualties 
later. The-present position in south and 
southeast Asia--representing still a 
rampart against the absolutely uncon-
trolled expansion of Communist China, 
which preaches to all its people that its 
ultimate aim is the destruction not only 
of the free world, but specifically the 
United States of America and its peo-
ple-it seems to me is only insurance 
against a future which seems so fore-
boding in terms of the intentions at the 
moment which Communist China de-
clared and reiterated for so very long. 
Mr. GROENING. Mr. President, will 
the Senator yield? 
Mr. JA VITS. Not yet. I shall yield 
In a moment. My only purpose in speak-
ing is that on the one hand we are told 
that we should have a completely open 
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mind about this area, that we should 
consider President de Gaulle's sugges-
tions--and I assume those of anyone 
else-and also that we should be search-
Ing for new methods, new techniques, 
and new ways of dealing with the prob-
lem. I believe It Is also Important to 
reiterate our fortitude and determina-
tion to stay In South VIetnam and do 
the job, though It is costly and difficult. 
We should reiterate our determmation 
to try to find a viable, freely elected gov-
ernment for South VIetnam, purswng 
very much the same policy that we have 
pursued, notwithstanding reverses. in 
South Korea, and for the very same rea-
sons. I merely reiterate that. I believe 
It Is extremely important. I do not 
think there should be any sapping or les-
sening of the morale of the Amencan 
people, nor do I believe that the Penta-
gon should be doubtful of the fortitude 
of the American people, or that there 
must be a promise that we will not pull 
out or they will not stick It out. That 
was the mistake made after World War 
n that was so costly to us In terms of the 
rise of the Communist power In Europe. 
It resulted In nothing but losses; and we 
are still licking our wounds today. We 
do not wish to repeat that experience In 
southeast Asia. 
It Is not necessary to have a repetition 
of the debate about morale, as we did 
with General MacArthur. It Is not nec-
essary for a determination that we must 
wipe out the northern base for this oper-
ation In South VIetnam. Sufficient 
unto the day Is the work thereof. 
All that must be reiterated now Is 
that we know what we are doing. We 
will continue to do it. It is worth doing. 
No one in the Pentagon or in the Senate 
need have the "jitters" about it. It Is 
high time that some people understand 
that the American people are adults. 
They understand that in order to make 
an omelet, some eggs must be broken. 
Mr. QRUENINO. Mr. President, will 
the Senator yield? 
Mr. JAVITS. ?-1ot yet. A little later. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, will 
the Senator yield? 
Mr. J A VITS. I should first like to 
finish my thought. 
Mr. MANSFIELV. The Senator has 
used a word which I believe needs cor-
rection. 
Mr. JAVITS. If the Senator would 
permit me to finish, I should be glad to 
withdraw the word "jitters." 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Very well. 
Mr. JAVITS. I wish to speak in the 
amrmatlve. I love the majority- leader 
too much to be critical. I mean that In 
every way. I wish to speak only In the 
amrmatlve. I think there must be co-
joined with whatever he has said and 
whatever Secretary McNamara has said 
about the fact that we will bring people 
back from Vietnam a reiteration of the 
American determination to do what we 
are doing, even though it involves losses, 
to persist In doing what we are doing, 
to undertake our commitment and to 
carry It through, because It is worth-
while and because the alternatives are 
great~r losses, both 1n national terms 
and In terms of killed and wounded and 
the expenditure of treasure. 
That Is all that needs to be said about 
It If we have both understandings, 
certamly the United States should al-
ways keep an open mind. I am sure the 
maJority leader, and others, as well as 
I, am for our experts In the State De-
partment and others using their lnge-
nulty to see If they cannot come for-
ward with a better line of policy. I 
have heard people raise some questions, 
but I think we are convinced that what 
we are doing Is ne·cessary and that no 
pullout Is necessary 111 order to placate 
a feeling by some American people that 
we are doing the wrong thing, On the 
contrary, it 1s the right tlllng, and I 
think we must contmue to do it Ill the 
national interest and In the int.crest of 
the American people 
Mr. GRUENING Mr President, will 
the Senator yield? 
Mr. JAVITS I yield 
Mr. GRUENING. I understand the 
Senator made a comparison of the 
United States long soJoum of 14 years 
1n South Korea with the situalion in 
South Vietnam Has the Senator noted 
the marked difference in the attitude of 
the South Koreans from that of the 
South Vietnamese? The South Koreans 
were opposed to the Communists. They 
fought bravely and incurred many losses. 
The United States went in there to help 
those who wanted to help themselves. 
There seems to be a lack of will on the 
part of the South Vietnamese to wage a 
fight against the Communists. It con-
trasts with the will to fight of the 
Koreans. That L~ the bas1s of our diffi-
culty in VIetnam. The Vietnamese 
show no great enthusiasm for being 
saved. That is why our performance 
there has not been as successful as it 
should have been. wm the Senator com-
ment on that point? 
Mr. JAVITS. Yes. On the first 
point, I would prefer not to say that the 
South Vietnamese have not been willing 
to fight . On occasion they have shown 
a great intrepidity and have sustained 
great losses, both civilian and military, 
It seems to me the problem has been 
one of government stability and the 
question of whether the government 
has had the interests of the people at 
heart. which has been a blow to morale. 
Nevertheless, I would not try to d1 aw a 
precise comparison between the South 
Koreans and the South VIetnamese. 
I was only pointing out that we have 
had mil1tary programs in a dangerous 
spot for a long period of time, and, not-
withstanding the dangers and losses, the 
policy has paid off, because the Com-
munist forces have been restrained 1n 
that area of the world for a very con-
siderable time. I was only making the 
analogy that we cannot look at these 
problems in terms of short swings, We 
must take the longer swings Into con-
sideration. That was the only compar-
Ison I was making. 
Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, will 
the Senator yield further? 
Mr. JAVITS. I yield . 
Mr. GRUENING. Does the Senator 
think that if our action in South Vietnam 
is not more successful than 1t appears to 
have been, we should go in there with 
greater strength. more manpower, and 
more equipment and v.1.n the war for the 
South VIetnamese? 
Mr. JAVITS. I think I have made my 
v1ews on that pomt ve1-y clear-that we 
ought to continue doing what we are 
doing I am not sittmg 111 the Pentagon 
and judging the strategiC and tactical 
necess1t1es If I could write a one-line 
directive, I think It would be that we 
should do what we nrc doing. We should 
continue w1th our "instruction" m that 
area. and support it with highly t.cch-
mcal assistance, and also incur the 
danger which is mvolved. which is a 
help tD the morale of the Vietnamese, 
and do our utmost to brmg about a freely 
elected government there. 
I cannot say to the Senator that I 
would send in a new group of instructors. 
or take out an old group, or increase the 
nwnber from 15.500 to 16,500, or reduce 
it U> 14.500. I do not know. That is 
why I have said we ~hould continue to 
do what we have been doing; that the 
effort Is worthwhile, and that the Ameri-
can people are backing it up, or should 
be; and that we should determine to 
cojoin our ideas. as was done in the 
debate engaged in yesterday, in looking 
at De Gaulle's neutralist Ideas, and 
thinking of other ways to deal with the 
problems. 
I had feared that unless our ideas 
were cojoined, the result might be to lead 
people to feel that the United States was 
looking for a way out. 
Mr. GRUENING. Mr. President, will 
the Senator yield further? 
Mr JAVITS. I yield 
Mr. GRUENING. I agree with the 
Scna.tor that there should be an open 
mmd, but I do not think anyone can 
state with any degree of assurance that 
our policy and performance in Vietnam 
to date have been successful. We have 
been in there for a long time and we 
have lost substantially, both in American 
lives, and in southeast Asia over four 
billion dollars in money. We are now 
spending at the rate of a million dollars 
a day. Will the Senator admit that if 
this situation continues much further 
Without success, we should have an al-
ternative? Does the Senator think that 
1f we continue In this way we should go 
in!A> that area with larger forces and 
sec if we can wm the war, instead of hav-
ing a stalemate, which would go on and 
on with loss of Amelican lives and sub-
stance? 
Mr. JAVITS. As to the increase in 
forces, I think I have answered that 
point by saying I would contmue U> do 
what we have been doing. At least we 
have outlined an objective and have 
learned what Is required to cany out 
that objective. 
W1th respect to the success or lack of 
it, I certainly am no apologist for the 
administration However, South Viet-
nam has not been taken over by the 
Communists. If that took place, it 
would be a disastrous rout for us. That 
has not happened I do not want it to 
happen 
I would certainly rather have that 
situation than the alternative. I am sure 
that the Senator from Montana, as well 
as I, and the rest of us, would want to 
guard against it. That Is the purpose of 
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my making this statement. When one 
gives tongue to an Idea, one can interest 
others in It, and perhaps arrive at a 
consensus, just as we should look at all 
problems with fairness, with open eyes, 
and try to decide on our own. But that 
is no "flap" for pulling out of Vietnam 
because certain people have determined 
that we should not pursue what we have 
been doing. That is all I have been try-
Ing to say today. 
Mr. GRUENING. I thank the Senator. 
Mr. JAVITS. I thank the Senator, 
and also the majority leader, for their 
kind contributions. 
Mr. PROUTY. Mr. President, will the 
Senator yield? 
Mr. JAVITS. I yield. 
Mr. PROUTY. The Senator from New 
York has rendered a. signal service to 
the country by a logical analysis of the 
situation in South Vietnam. What 
really concerns the top mll1tary person-
nel in the Pentagon is the fact that 
measures are not being taken which 
would enable them to win the war with 
Vietnam. I think that concerns our of-
ficials. I commend the Senator from 
New York. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, w!ll 
the Senator yield? 
Mr. JAVITS. I yield. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. The discussion 
which has taken place this afternoon 
has broken a long s!lence on affairs in 
Vietnam. The distinguished Senator 
from New York has performed a service. 
I know he agrees with me when I say 
the answer is not an increase in forces 
or resources, to carry the war into North 
Vietnam or, for that matter, possibly 
into Communist China Itself. I know he 
agrees with me that the answer is not 
a withdraw!\! of the American forces in 
South Vietnam at the present time. But 
if he agrees with me in those two re-
spects, I believe we should keep an open 
mind to consider other possib!lities. 
Wh!le we may disagree with a man of 
the stature of General de Gaulle from 
time to time-and I do, most certainly-
nevertheless, I have a great respect for 
him because I believe he is doing for his 
country that which France, by and large, 
wishes him to do. When he does these 
things, he sometimes comes Into dis-
agreement with his allies; but that is 
his responsibility, just as what we do is 
our responsib!l!ty. 
The mere fact that he advanced the 
Idea covering the old associated states 
of French Indochina does not neces-
sarily mean that our reaction should be 
to treat it in a casual way or to pay no 
attention to it. 
I believe an open mind is a good thing. 
I believe discussions concerning a most 
dilllcult part of the world in which we 
are heavily involved are worthwhile. I 
believe that so far as Vietnam is con-
cerned, it is just as important as Cuba, 
even though one Is 10,000 miles away 
and the other is only 90 miles from our 
shores. 
I point out that late news stories are 
to the effect that no more dependents 
would go to Guantanamo, and that those 
who are there would be brought home 
when their regular tours of duty were 
over, If not before. Perhaps we have too 
many dependents in South Vietnam. 
Perhaps a conftict of !Dterest exists be-
cause of th1s fact. But I point out, 1! my 
understanding Is correct, that what we 
have sent to South Vietnam are probably 
the best we have In the way of fighting 
men, that they are the elite of the varl-
ous services, and that they all volun-
teered for that hazardous duty. But 
there Is no reason why discussion should 
not occur. There Is no reason why de-
bate and differences on the floor of the 
Senate should not be stated because ways 
and means will have to be found not only 
in South Vietnam, but elsewhere 
throughout the world, to face the changes 
which occur and to try to do our best 
as the leader of the free world, as the 
Nation charged with the primary respon-
s!b!l!ty, in my opinion, in too many areas 
of the world, to find different answers 
and to face different changes In different 
times. 
Mr. JAVITS. As to my answers in 
agreement or disagreement with respect 
to the basic posture of the Senator from 
Montana, I have already expressed my 
views in my address, and I shall let those 
answers stand as answers to those ques-
tions. 
As to General de Gaulle, I too, have 
great respect for him. He was a great 
hero during the war. He is a great hero 
to his people. I deeply believe, however, 
that General de Gaulle could not be 
doing what he is doing for France unless 
we were around to do what we are doing 
for the free world, and that so long as 
this is a rather free ride, we had better 
be wary of how we operate in taking 
these grand suggestions. 
That Is the only thing I stressed In 
my speech-that we had better not be 
distracted from persevering in the basic 
policy in relation' to the free world, and 
that our people, in my judgment, should 
support it. 
That was the reason for my speaking 
today. I agree with the Senator from 
Montana that the airing of this issue is 
valuable. 
I believe that he and I made somewhat 
similar speeches In regard to Berlin. 
The Senator from Montana flr:;t au-
thored the suggestion with respect to 
some possible change or consideration of 
a change In the status of Berlin. He 
took up the issue in much the same way 
I am doing today, In order, if possible, 
to reach a consensus. I believe the 
Senator from Connecticut [Mr. Doool 
participated in this debate, along with 
many other Senators. The result was a 
better consciousness in the United States 
of its policy and determination as to how 
to pursue it to the best effect. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, wlll 
the Senator from New York yield at that 
point? 
Mr. JAVITS. I yield. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. There was a 
change which resulted In the wall being 
created between East and West Berlin, 
instead of a unified Berlin, a Berlin to 
be the future capital of a unified Ger-
many. 
Mr. JAVITS. I do not wish to raise 
that problem again, but it was my view 
that the r~t might have been ex-
tremely dangerous to the continued 
presence in Berlin of the allies. At the 
time, the Russians could easily have 
taken over Berlin and made of it the 
capital of East Germany. In any case, 
the decision could have gone either way, 
in my judgment, but I believe that our 
debate upon the subject or consideration 
of the subject Is helpful to the country, 
as I hope this one wUl be. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. Speaking of Ber-
lin, this Is one area in the world where 
the U .S . Government is !D effect begging 
the Soviet authorities and the Soviet 
troops to remain, because we do not wish 
to displace them by East Germans. 
Mr. JAVITS. Mr. President, that Is 
a subject which I shall be glad to dis-
cuss at some other time; but right now 
I believe we had better keep our eyes 
fastened on the Vietnamese ball, which 
is serious enough. 
Mr. MANSFIELD. It is always a 
pleasure and a privilege to have the op-
portunity to debate and diacuss !s.sues, 
both foreign and domestic, with the dis-
tinguished Senator from New York. 
Mr. JAVITS. I am grateful to the 
Senator for those remarks. I am pleased 
at his reference to me. He knows full 
well that I deeply feel the same way 
about him. 
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